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Abstract. A group of agents participate in a cooperative enterprise producing
a single good. Each participant contributes a particular type of input; output is
nondecreasing in these contributions. How should it be shared?
We analyze the implications of the axiom of Group Monotonicity: if a group
of agents simultaneously decrease their input contributions, not all of them should
receive a higher share of output. We show that in combination with other more
familiar axioms, this condition pins down a very small class of methods, which we
dub nearly serial.
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1. Introduction
A group of agents participate in a cooperative enterprise producing a single good (which
we may think of as money). Each participant contributes a possibly dierent type of
input; total output is a nondecreasing function of these contributions. How should this
total output (or gross proﬁt) be shared? We search for a simple method that would com-
pute output shares as a function of the proﬁle of input contributions and the production
function.
The case where input levels are either zero or one —each agent merely chooses whether
to participate in the enterprise or not— corresponds to the model of cooperative games. In
this much studied framework, the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) stands out as the central
sharing method. It is characterized by the three simple properties of Additivity, Dummy,
and Anonymity: output shares depend additively on the production function, totally
unproductive agents receive zero, and equally productive agents get the same share.
We are interested here in the more complex problem where each participant may choose
any level of input contribution. Dierences in output shares should now reﬂect not only
the dierences in productivity, as the Shapley value does in the simpler case, but also
the dierences in the levels of input contributions. For instance, if two agents are equally
productive, the one who contributes a higher level of input should get a bigger share of
output.
It is not surprising that in this richer model, Shapley’s three axioms, properly reformu-
lated, no longer characterize a unique method: there are dierent ways of combining the
productivity and the sheer quantity of an input to compute the output share it deserves.
Three prominent methods emerge from the literature. The Shapley-Shubik method (Shu-
bik, 1962) applies the Shapley value to the so-called stand-alone game in which the worth
of a coalition is the output generated by the input contributions of its members. The
Aumann-Shapley method, as adapted from Aumann and Shapley (1974) by Billera and
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Heath (1982) and Mirman and Tauman (1982), gives each agent the integral of his mar-
ginal product along the ray from zero to the input contribution proﬁle. The serial method
(Friedman and Moulin, 1999) integrates the marginal product of each agent along the
constrained-diagonal path to the input contribution proﬁle.1 We refer to Friedman and
Moulin (1999) for a comparison of these three methods. Moulin (2002) oers a general
survey, including a discussion of the (suitable reformulation of the) above methods in the
case where inputs come in indivisible units; see also Moulin (1995).
In order to evaluate the relative merits of these and other methods, it is useful to
formulate further axioms. An early example in the literature is Scale Invariance, stating
that the output shares should not depend on the units of measurement of the inputs. This
axiom is central in the classic characterizations of the Aumann-Shapley method (Billera
and Heath, 1982, and Mirman and Tauman, 1982).
The very nature of the variable-input model suggests conditions linking the output
shares in problems with dierent proﬁles of input contributions. Perhaps the simplest
such condition is Monotonicity: a participant’s share of output should be nondecreasing
in his input contribution. Even though preferences are not an explicit component of our
model, Monotonicity is readily interpreted as an incentive-compatibility condition. Any
agent whose preferences are increasing in output and decreasing in the level of input
supplied would have an incentive to manipulate a method that fails to be monotonic.
Moulin (1995), who introduces the axiom, observes that it is satisﬁed by the Shapley-
Shubik and the serial methods but is violated by the Aumann-Shapley method.
Moulin and Sprumont (2004) strengthen Monotonicity by requiring that an increase
in input contributions by a group of agents should not lead to a strict decrease in the
output share of each of them. This is Group Monotonicity. A violation of this axiom
leads to the possibility of strategic coordinated deﬂation of input contributions: all agents
in some group could get a strictly higher share of output by agreeing to all reduce their
contribution. In a cooperative environment where communication between agents is easy,
Group Monotonicity is a compelling incentive-compatibility condition. Moulin and Spru-
mont (2004) show that the Shapley-Shubik method violates this condition, while the serial
method satisﬁes it.
The purpose of this paper is to identify which methods meeting Shapley’s three basic
axioms satisfy Group Monotonicity. We work in the discrete version of the output-sharing
model. Each agent i contributes an integer level of input xi; given the proﬁle x of all
agents’ contributions and the production function F, our method must allocate the total
output F (x).
The best known methods meeting Additivity and Dummy are the path methods. Fix
an input proﬁle x and consider a sequence {zt} from zero to x where each zt is obtained
from its predecessor by increasing the input level of exactly one agent by one unit. For
any production function F , compute any agent’s output share by summing his marginal
products along this sequence: agent i thus receives
P
(F (zt)  F (zt1)) where the sum
is taken over those t for which zt obtains from zt1 by increasing i’s contribution by one
unit. Under the ﬁxed-path methods, the paths used for dierent input proﬁles x, x0are
related: they obtain by projection of a single unbounded path in input space. The so-
called ﬁxed-ﬂow methods introduced in Moulin and Sprumont (2004) are essentially the
1The constrained-diagonal (or constrained-egalitaran) path to an input proﬁle x is the projection on
[0, x] of the diagonal path zi = zj for all i, j. The method is called serial because it delivers the well-known
serial formula of Moulin and Shenker (1992, 1994) when all inputs are perfect substitutes, that is, when
total output depends only on the sum of the quantities supplied.
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convex combinations of ﬁxed-path methods.
Our ﬁrst result is an axiomatization of the latter methods. We use a new powerful
variant of the Dummy axiom, Independence of Dummy Changes, stating that if the pro-
ductivity of an agent is zero beyond a certain level of contribution, any input increase
beyond that level should leave the output shares unchanged. Theorem 1 asserts that Ad-
ditivity, Independence of Dummy Changes, and the mild requirement of Zero Output for
Zero Input characterize the ﬁxed-ﬂow methods.
Building on this result, we then explore the implications of Group Monotonicity. As
already mentioned, an important example of a group-monotonic method is the serial
method. In our discrete model, all the unbounded paths staying as close as possible to
the line zi = zj for all i, j qualify as “diagonal”; the serial method (Moulin, 1995) obtains
by averaging the corresponding “diagonal” ﬁxed-path methods. Theorem 2 states that
the ﬁxed-ﬂow methods satisfying Anonymity and Group Monotonicity are, in a sense that
will be made precise, nearly serial : they average ﬁxed-path methods that are all nearly
diagonal. Thus our axioms essentially characterize the serial method. We conjecture that
an exact characterization holds in the continuous case.
A ﬁnal word is in order about related contributions. Axiomatizations of various meth-
ods of the serial family exist in the literature. Moulin and Shenker (1994) characterize
the serial formula for the case of perfectly substitutable inputs using an axiom placing
upper bounds on output shares. With the aid of a similar axiom, Moulin (1995) and
Friedman and Moulin (1999) characterize the serial method in the discrete and continu-
ous contexts respectively. As noted in Moulin and Sprumont (2003), the Upper Bound
axiom is intuitively reminiscent of the very serial formula. By contrast, none of the ax-
ioms used in Theorem 2 is directly related to a serial-type formula. Finally, Moulin and
Sprumont (2003) oer an axiomatization of the serial method based on the property of
Distributivity, which states that the sharing method should commute with the composi-
tion of production functions. This mathematical property akin to Additivity has no clear
normative or strategic interpretation. By contrast, our main axiom, Group Monotonicity,
is meaningful on both counts.
2. The model
Each agent i in a ﬁnite set N = {1, ..., n} contributes an integer quantity xi 5 N = {0, 1, 2,
...} of a personalized input. The output generated by the input proﬁle x 5 NN must be
split among the members of N. A production function is a mapping F : NN $ R+ that
is nondecreasing and satisﬁes F (0) = 0; the set of such mappings is denoted F(N). A
(output-sharing) method (for N) is a mapping * which assigns to each problem (F, x) 5
F(N) × NN a vector of nonnegative output shares *(F, x) 5 RN+ satisfying the budget
balance condition
P
i5N *i(F, x) = F (x).
An alternative interpretation of this model is to regard x as a demand proﬁle and
F as a cost function: * is then a cost-sharing method. We prefer the output-sharing
interpretation because we ﬁnd one of our axioms in Section 3, Independence of Dummy
Changes, more convincing in that context.
We use the following notation. The set of extended natural numbers is N = N^{+4}.
Vector inequalities are written , <,¿. For any x 5 NN and x0 5 NN , [x, x0] = {z 5
N
N | x  z  x0} and ]x, x0] = [x, x0]\{x}. For any S  N , we denote by xS 5 NS the
restriction of x to S and write x(S) =
P
i5S xi.We sometimes write i for {i}, ij for {i, j},
and S for N\S. We deﬁne eS 5 NN by eSi = 1 if i 5 S and eSi = 0 otherwise. If i 5 N
and F 5 F(N), we deﬁne CiF : NN $ R+ by CiF (z) = F (z)F (z ei) whenever zi > 0
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and, by convention, CiF (z) = 0 whenever zi = 0.
3. The fixed-flow methods
This section proposes a simple axiomatization of the ﬁxed-ﬂow methods introduced in
Moulin and Sprumont (2004). The ﬁrst two axioms are well known, the third is new.
Additivity. For all F,F 0 5 F(N) and x 5 NN , *(F + F 0, x) = *(F, x) + *(F 0, x).
This powerful mathematical property is very convenient in practice. Consider a coop-
erative enterprise producing several goods which it sells on a market. The ﬁnal good to
be shared among theparticipants is money and the total amount is the sum of the sales of
the dierent goods. One may apply the sharing method directly to the aggregated sales
or use it to divide the sales of each good and then add up the resulting shares. If the
method is additive, the two procedures are equivalent. This is useful from an incentive
viewpoint because the proper level of application of the method is not a matter of dispute.
Our second axiom says that an agent who contributes nothing should receive nothing.
Zero Output for Zero Input. For all F 5 F(N), x 5 NN , and i 5 N, {xi = 0} ,
{*i(F, x) = 0}.
Our third axiom is inspired by the traditional Dummy axiom according to which a
“dummy”, that is, a completely unproductive agent, should receive zero: for all F 5 F(N),
x 5 NN , and i 5 N, {CiF (z) = 0 for all z 5 NN} , {*i(F, x) = 0}. Our condition says
that “dummy changes” in input contributions should have no eect on output shares.
Irrelevance of Dummy Changes. For all F 5 F(N), x 5 NN , and i 5 N, {CiF (z) = 0
for all z such that zi > xi}, {*(F, (zi, xi)) = *(F, x) for all zi > xi}.
Taken together, Zero Output for Zero Input and Irrelevance of Dummy Changes imply
Dummy. In fact, they deliver a stronger property known as Strong Dummy: for all
F 5 F(N), x 5 NN , and i 5 N, {CiF (z) = 0 for all z 5 NN} , {*i(F, x) = 0 and
*j(F, x) = *j(F, (0i, xi)) for all j 5 N\i}. This says that a dummy agent gets zero and
that his input contribution does not aect others’ output shares.
In order to describe the methods meeting Additivity, Zero Output for Zero Input, and
Irrelevance of Dummy Changes, we use Moulin and Vohra’s (2003) characterization of the
methods satisfying Additivity and Dummy.
Deﬁnition 1. A (unit) ﬂow to an input proﬁle x 5 NN is a mapping f(., x) : [0, x]$ RN+
such that fi(z, x) = 0 if zi = 0,
P
i5N(0,x) fi(e
i, x) = 1, and
P
i5N
fi(z, x) =
P
i5N(z,x)
fi(z + e
i, x) for all z 5]0, x], (1)
where N(z, x) = {i 5 N |zi < xi}. Conditions (1) are the so-called ﬂow conservation
constraints. A ﬂow system is a list f = {f(., x)|x 5 NN}, where each f(., x) is a ﬂow to
x.
Moulin and Vohra (2003) prove that a method * satisﬁes Additivity and Dummy if
and only if there is a ﬂow system f such that
*i(F, x) =
P
z5[0,x]
fi(z, x)CiF (z) for all F 5 F(N), x 5 NN , and i 5 N. (2)
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This system f is unique; we say that it represents *. Notice that all such methods
guarantee Zero Output for Zero Input. Observe also that the ﬂows to dierent input
proﬁles are totally unrelated.
We will be concerned with ﬂow systems where the ﬂow to an input proﬁle is simply
the projection of the ﬂow to any higher input proﬁle. For further use, we deﬁne the
projection operator in full generality. Let z 5 NN , z 5 NN , z  z. For any T  N ,
any mapping h : [z, z] $ RT and any x 5 [z, z], the projection of h on [z, x] is the
mapping p[z,x]h : [z, x] $ RT deﬁned as follows. For any i 5 T and z 5 [z, x], write
Ki(z) = {j 5 N\i | zj = xj} and let
(p[z,x]h)i(z) = hi(z) if Ki(z) = >,
=
P
wKi(z)5[xKi(z),zKi(z)]
hi(wKi(z), zKi(z)) otherwise.
Note that if f(., x) is a ﬂow to x and x0  x, then p[0,x0]f(., x) is a ﬂow to x0.
Deﬁnition 2. A ﬁxed ﬂow system is a ﬂow system f such that
{x0  x}, {f(., x0) = p[0,x0]f(., x)} for all x, x0 5 NN . (3)
A method * is a ﬁxed-ﬂow method if it is represented by a ﬁxed ﬂow system.
The ﬁxed-ﬂow methods were deﬁned in Moulin and Sprumont (2004) under the re-
striction that input proﬁles are bounded above by some x 5 NN . In that case, the single
ﬂow f(., x) and the projection property (3) fully determine the entire ﬂow system f . In
our unbounded version, the ﬂow f(., x) to any input proﬁle x completely determines the
ﬂows to all input proﬁles x0  x. In particular, this implies that the system f is completely
determined by the subsystem {f(., keN )|k 5 N}.
Theorem 1. Let N be an arbitrary nonempty ﬁnite set of agents. An output-sharing
method * for N satisﬁes Additivity, Zero Output for Zero Input, and Irrelevance of
Dummy Changes if and only if * is a ﬁxed-ﬂow method.
Proof. The “if” statement is easily checked. To prove the converse statement, ﬁx a
method * meeting the three axioms. Because Zero Output for Zero Input and Irrelevance
of Dummy Changes imply Dummy, the Moulin-Vohra representation theorem applies: let
f be the unique ﬂow system representing * through formula (2). We show that f is a
ﬁxed ﬂow system.
In order to establish property (3), it is enough to prove that
f(., x) = p[0,x]f(., x+ e
i) for all x 5 NN and i 5 N. (4)
This is because p[0,x00]p[0,x0]f(., x) = p[0,x00]f(., x) whenever x
00  x0  x, as is clear from
Deﬁnition 2.
The proof of (4) makes use of the following particular type of production function. For
any i 5 N and z 5 NN such that zi > 0, we deﬁne zj0 := z  ziei + ej if j 5 N\i, zi0 := z,
and let
F iz(w) = 1 if w  z
j
0 for some j 5 N, and 0 otherwise. (5)
By construction,
CiF iz(w) = 1 if w = z, and 0 otherwise, (6)
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and
CjF iz(w) = 0 whenever wj  zj + 2. (7)
We are now ready to prove (4). Fix x 5 NN and i 5 N. The case x = 0 being trivial,
assume x 6= 0. We claim ﬁrst that
fi(z, x) = fi(z, x+ e
i) for all z 5 [0, x]. (8)
To see why this is true, ﬁx z 5 [0, x]. If zi = 0, fi(z, x) = fi(z, x+ei) = 0 by deﬁnition: so
we may assume zi > 0. Consider the production function F
i
z . By deﬁnition, CiF iz(w) = 0
whenever wi > xi. Thus, by Irrelevance of Dummy Changes, *(F iz , x + ei) = *(F iz , x).
Focusing on agent i’s output share and using (2) and (6), fi(z, x) = *i(F iz , x) = *i(F iz , x+
ei) = fi(z, x+ e
i).
Next we claim that
fj(z, x) = fj(z, x+ e
i) for all j 5 N\i and all z 5 [0, x] such that zi < xi. (9)
Fix j 5 N\i and z 5 [0, x] such that zi < xi. If zj = 0, fj(z, x) = fj(z, x + ei) = 0, so
assume zj > 0. Consider the production function F
j
z . By deﬁnition, CiF jz (w) = 0 whenever
wi  zi + 2. Since zi < xi, CiF jz (w) = 0 whenever wi > xi. By Irrelevance of Dummy
Changes, *(F jz , x + ei) = *(F jz , x). Focusing on agent j and using the representation
formula (2), fj(z, x) = *j(F jz , x) = *j(F jz , x+ ei) = fj(z, x+ ei).
To complete the proof of (4), it remains to be shown that
fj(z, x) = fj(z, x+e
i)+fj(z+e
i, x+ei) for all j 5 N\i and all z 5 [0, x] such that zi = xi.
Fix j 5 N\i and z 5 [0, x] such that zi = xi. Let F be the production function such that
CiF (w) = 0 for all w 5 NN , and
CjF (w) = 1 if wi = zi, and 0 otherwise.
This production function is easily constructed: deﬁne it ﬁrst on those input proﬁles such
that zi = 0 by modifying the procedure in (5), then extend it to all proﬁles by setting
F (z) = F (0i, zi). By Irrelevance of Dummy Changes, *j(F, x+ei) = *j(F, x). Applying
the representation formula (2),
*j(F, x) =
xiP
wi=0
fj((wi, zi), x),
*j(F, x+ e
i) =
xi+1P
wi=0
fj((wi, zi), x+ e
i).
Taking (9) into account, this means that fj((xi, zi), x) = fj((xi, zi), x+ e
i) + fj((xi +
1, zi), x+ e
i). Recalling that zi = xi, this means fj(z, x) = fj(z, x+ e
i) + fj(z + e
i, x+
ei).
The axioms in Theorem 1 are independent. This follows directly from the independence
of the axioms used in Theorem 2, which is established in the next section.
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4. The nearly serial methods
Building on the previous section, we now show how two further axioms, Anonymity and
Group Monotonicity, circumscribe the very small subclass of ﬁxed-ﬂow methods that we
call nearly serial.
We begin by deﬁning Anonymity. Denote by (N) the set of bijections from N into
itself and let  5 (N). If z 5 RN+ , deﬁne z 5 RN+ by (z)(i) = zi for all i 5 N. If
F 5 F(N), deﬁne F 5 F(N) by F (z) = F (z) for all z 5 NN .
Anonymity. For all  5 (N), F 5 F(N), and x 5 NN , *(F,x) = *(F, x).
This axiom expresses the familiar idea that the names of the agents should be ignored
when computing the output shares: it is generally accepted as a basic notion of fairness.
Our formulation implies weaker symmetry properties used in the literature: for instance,
agents with equal input contributions receive the same output share when the production
function is symmetric.
A method * satisfying Additivity and Dummy meets Anonymity if and only if its
ﬂow system f satisﬁes f(z,x) = f(z, x) for all x 5 NN , z 5 [0, x], and  5 (N).
Su!ciency is clear from the representation formula (2). For a proof of necessity, suppose *
meets Anonymity and ﬁx x, z, and  as required. Let i 5 N and consider the production
function F iz deﬁned in (5). By (2) and Anonymity, fi(z, x) = *i(F, x) = *(i)(F,x) =
f(i)(z,x), as claimed.
Focusing now on ﬁxed-ﬂow methods, let k 5 N and consider the input proﬁle keN
where all agents contribute k units. We say that a ﬂow f(., keN ) to keN is anonymous if
f(z, keN ) = f(z, keN ) for all z 5 [0, keN ] and  5 (N). (10)
Taking into account the remark following Deﬁnition 2, a ﬁxed-ﬂow method * meets
Anonymity if and only if each ﬂow f(., keN ), k 5 N, is anonymous. We then say that the
ﬁxed ﬂow system f is anonymous.
We introduce now the serial and nearly serial methods. In order to do so, we need
some further deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 3. Let D = {z 5 NN | |zi  z(N)n | < 1 for all i 5 N} and D = {z 5 N
N |
|zi  z(N)n |  1 for all i 5 N}; we call these sets the diagonal and near-diagonal of N
N .
If f(., x) is a ﬂow to an input proﬁle x 5 NN , the set S(f, x) = {z 5 [0, x]|f(z, x) 6= 0}
is called the support of f(., x). A ﬂow f(., keN ) is diagonal if S(f, keN )  D, and nearly
diagonal if S(f, keN )  D. A ﬁxed ﬂow system f is (nearly) diagonal if f(., keN ) is
(nearly) diagonal for all k 5 N.
A quick description of D and D may be useful. For each t 5 N, deﬁne (t) = {z 5 NN |
z(N) = t} and let D(t) = D _(t) and D(t) = D _(t).
If t is a multiple of n, say t = rn for some r 5 N, then D(t) = {reN}. If t = rn + 1
for some r 5 N, D(t) is made up of all permutations of the point (r + 1, r, ..., r). More
generally, if t = rn + k for some r 5 N and k 5 {1, ..., n  1}, D(t) is made up of all
permutations of the point (r + 1)e{1,...,k} + re{k+1,...,n}.
The set D(t) coincides with D(t) whenever t is not a positive multiple of n. If t
is a positive multiple of n, say t = nr for some r 5 N\{0}, then D(t) is larger than
D(t). It contains all points that can be written as (r + 1)e{1,...k} + re{k+1,...,nk} + (r 
1)e{nk+1,...,n} for some integer k, 0  k  n2 (with the understanding that e
> = 0), and
all their permutations.
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Figures 1 and 2 illustrate D and D when n = 2 and 3 respectively.
It is well known that there is only one anonymous ﬂow to the one-unit-contribution
proﬁle eN , namely
fSi (z, e
N ) =
ni(z)!(n ni(z) 1)!
n!
for all i 5 N such that zi = 1,
where ni(z) = |{j 5 N\i | zj = 1}| . As an illustration, Figure 3 depicts fS(., e{1,2,3}).
On the subset {(F, eN ) | F 5 F(N)} (that is, on the problems corresponding to standard
cooperative games), the ﬂow fS(., eN ) generates the Shapley value.
Next, ﬁx k 5 N. Because the support of a diagonal ﬂow to keN is included in the union
of the unit cubes [0, eN ], [eN , 2eN ], ..., [(k1)eN , keN ], there is a unique anonymous diag-
onal ﬂow to keN : we denote it fs(., keN ). Figure 4 depicts fs(., 2e{1,2,3}). Recalling the
remarks following Deﬁnition 2, the subsystem {fs(., keN )|k 5 N} completely determines
a unique ﬁxed ﬂow system, which we denote fs.
Deﬁnition 4. The serial method *s is the output-sharing method represented by the
unique anonymous diagonal ﬁxed ﬂow system fs.
This method was proposed by Moulin (1995). When all inputs are perfect substitutes,
that is, when the production function takes the form F (z) = eF (z(N)) for some functioneF from N to R+, it reduces to the well-known serial mechanism (Moulin and Shenker,
1992): assuming without loss of generality that x1  x2  ...  xn, the output shares
are *1(F, x) = 1n eF (nx1), *2(F, x) = 1n eF (nx1) + 1n1 [ eF (x1 + (n  1)x2)  eF (nx1)], ...,
*n(F, x) = 1n eF (nx1) + 1n1 [ eF (x1 + (n 1)x2) eF (nx1)] + ...+ [ eF (x1 + x2 + ...+ xn)eF (x1 + x2 + ...+ xn2 + 2xn1)].
The methods we will characterize are only slight variations of the serial method.
Deﬁnition 5. A nearly serial method is an output-sharing method represented by an
anonymous nearly diagonal ﬁxed ﬂow system.
While there are several anonymous nearly diagonal ﬁxed ﬂow systems, they form a
rather small family. Each such system f is conveniently represented by a single anonymous
nearly diagonal unbounded ﬂow, that is, a mapping f : NN $ RN+ such that f i(z) = 0 if
z /5 D or z  ei /5 D,
P
i5N f i(e
i) = 1,
P
i5N
f i(z) =
P
i5N
f i(z + e
i) for all z 5 D\{0}, (11)
and
f(z) = f(z) for all z 5 D. (12)
For each x 5 RN , f(., x) = p[0,x]f . We let S(f) = {z 5 NN | f(z) 6= 0}.
A ﬁrst important observation is that D(t) is a perfectly symmetric set whenever t is
not a multiple of n: each element of D(t) is a permutation of any other element of D(t).
Therefore, the anonymity condition (12) implies that, for any t that is not a positive
multiple of n, S(f) _ (t) = (t), and f is completely determined on (t) once it is
determined on (t 1).
A second observation is that S(f) _(t) is necessarily a rather small subset of D(t)
when t is a positive multiple of n. In fact, for all r 5 N\{0} and all z 5 D(rn),
[f(z) 6= 0], [z = reN or z is a permutation of (r  1)e1 + re{2,..,n1} + (r + 1)en].
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This follows immediately from the ﬂow conservation constraints (11). So S(f)_(rn) is
the union of a singleton and a perfectly symmetric set.
These two observations imply that f is fully characterized by a sequence {r}r5N\{0}
in [0, 1], where
r =
P
i5N
f i(re
N ) (13)
is the fraction of the total (unit) ﬂow that goes through reN . This is illustrated in Figure
5 for n = 2 and in Figures 6.a and 6.b for n = 3. (Note that S(f) _(rn) is a strict
subset of (rn) only when n  4.) Choosing r = 1 for all r guarantees that f is in fact
diagonal, that is, S(f)  D, and generates the serial method.
We now come to our central axiom and our main result. We ask that when a group
of agents increase their input contributions, not all of them get less output.
Group Monotonicity. For all F 5 F(N), all x, x0 5 NN , and all nonempty S  N,
{xi < x
0
i for all i 5 S and xi = x0i for all i 5 N\S} , {there exists i 5 S such that
*i(F, x)  *i(F, x0)}.
This property is a natural generalization of the standard Monotonicity axiom, which
corresponds to the case where S is a singleton. As discussed in the Introduction, Group
Monotonicity is best defended from the strategic angle: it prevents coordinated deﬂation
of input contributions.
Theorem 2. Let N be a ﬁnite set containing at least three agents. An output-sharing
method * for N satisﬁes Additivity, Zero Output for Zero Input, Irrelevance of Dummy
Changes, Anonymity, and Group Monotonicity if and only if * is a nearly serial method.
Proof.
The rather tedious proof of the “if” statement is relegated to the Appendix. In order
to prove the “only if” statement, let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be a set of agents, n  3. Let
* be an output-sharing method for N meeting all ﬁve axioms in Theorem 2. Recalling
Theorem 1 and the remarks following the deﬁnition of Anonymity, * is represented by a
unique anonymous ﬁxed ﬂow system f. We will prove by induction on n that f is nearly
diagonal.
Step 1. f is nearly diagonal if n = 3.
We ﬁx N = {1, 2, 3} and claim that S(f, keN )  D for all k 5 N\{0}. To prove our
claim its su!ces to show
;k 5 N\{0}, ;t 5 N\{0} such that t  k, S(f, keN ) _(t)  D(t). (14)
(Indeed, let k 5 N\{0} and suppose z 5 S(f, keN )  D. Set t := z(N). If t  k, (14)
implies z 5 D, as desired. If t > k, simply choose k0  t > k. By the ﬁxed-ﬂow property,
z 5 S(f, k0eN), so that (14) implies S(f, k0eN ) _(t)  D(t), hence z 5 D again.)
From now on, we ﬁx k 5 N\{0} and (with a slight abuse of notation) write f instead
of f(., keN ). We show by induction on t that S(f) _(t)  D(t) for all t 5 N\{0}.
If t = 1, the anonymity of f directly implies that
S(f) _(1) = D(1).
Next we ﬁx t, 2  t  k, assume S(f)_()  D() for  = 1, ..., t1, and show that
S(f) _(t) = D(t). Recall that the set D(t) may be of three dierent types depending
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on the value of t :
D(t) = {(r, r, r + 1), (r, r + 1, r), (r + 1, r, r)}
if t = 3r + 1 for some r 5 N\{0},
D(t) = {(r, r + 1, r + 1), (r + 1, r, r + 1), (r + 1, r + 1, r)}
if t = 3r + 2 for some r 5 N,
D(t) = {(r, r, r), (r  1, r, r + 1), (r  1, r + 1, r), (r, r  1, r + 1),
(r, r + 1, r  1), (r + 1, r  1, r), (r + 1, r, r  1)}
if t = 3r for some r 5 N\{0}.
We deal with each type separately. Given z 5 NN\{0}, we call f(z) = (f1(z), f2(z), f3(z))
the ﬂow at z. By the ﬂow at a set Z we mean the collection {f(z) | z 5 Z}.
Case 1: t = 3r + 1 for some r 5 N\{0}.
By the induction hypothesis, S(f) _ (3r)  D(3r). The latter set is made up of 7
points: (r, r, r) and the 6 permutations of (r  1, r, r + 1). The induction hypothesis also
ensures that S(f) _(3r  1)  D(3r  1), which is made up of the three permutations
of (r  1, r, r). By Anonymity of f , the ﬂow at D(3r) is therefore determined up to one
parameter  5 [0, 1] :
f(r, r, r) = (

3
,

3
,

3
),
f(r  1, r, r + 1) = (0, 0,
1 
6
),
and the ﬂow at each permutation of (r 1, r, r+1) obtains by applying that permutation
to f(r  1, r, r + 1). See Figure 7.
We want to show that
S(f) _(3r + 1)  D(3r + 1),
where D(3r + 1) is made up of the three permutations of (r, r, r + 1). By the induction
hypothesis, ﬂow conservation and the anonymity of f , it su!ces to show that
f1(r + 1, r + 1, r  1) = 0 (15)
and
f1(r + 2, r, r  1) = 0. (16)
The ﬂow at D(3r + 1) is then fully determined by ﬂow conservation: f(r + 1, r, r) =
(3 , ,
1
6 ,
1
6 ) and the ﬂow at the permuted points obtains by permutation. See Figure
8.
To prove (15), suppose, by way of contradiction, f1(r+1, r+1, r1) = f2(r+1, r+1, r
1) = , 0 <   16 .Write g = f(., (r+1, r+1, r+1)), the projection of f on [0, (r+1)e
N ],
and note that g is fully determined. In particular, g(r + 1, r  1, r + 1) = (, 0,),
g(r  1, r + 1, r + 1) = (0,,), and g(r, r, r + 1) = (16  ,
1
6  ,

3 ). Deﬁne the
production function F by F (w) = 1 if w  z for some z 5 {(r, r, r + 1), (r + 1, r 
1, r+1), (r 1, r+1, r+ 1)} and F (w) = 0 otherwise. Then *1(F, (r+ 1, r+1, r+1)) =
*2(F, (r+1, r+1, r+1)) = ( 16 )+ =
1
6 . But using the ﬁxed-ﬂow property, compute
now *1(F, (r, r, r + 1)) = g1(r, r, r + 1) + g1(r, r + 1, r + 1) = (16  ) + 2 =
1
6 + ,
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which is also *2(F, (r, r, r + 1)) by Anonymity. This violates Group Monotonicity. See
Figure 9.
We have proved (15). In fact, we have shown more, namely g1(r + 1, r + 1, r  1) (=
g2(r + 1, r + 1, r  1)) = 0. As a consequence, by ﬂow conservation,
g3(r + 1, r + 1, r) = 0.
In order to prove (16), suppose f1(r + 2, r, r  1) = f2(r, r + 2, r  1) = , 0 <   16 .
Deﬁne the production function F 0 by F 0(w) = 1 if w  z for some z 5 {(r+1, r+1, r), (r+
2, r, r), (r, r + 2, r)} and F (w) = 0 otherwise. See Figure 10. Then *3(F 0, (r + 1, r +
1, r + 1)) = g3(r + 1, r + 1, r) = 0. On the other hand, by the ﬁxed-ﬂow property and
ﬂow conservation, *3(F 0, (r + 2, r + 2, r + 1))  *3(F 0, (r + 2, r + 2, r)) = 2 > 0. Using
Anonymity, *i(F 0, (r+1, r+1, r+ 1)) > *i(F 0, (r+2, r+2, r+1)) for i = 1, 2, violating
Group Monotonicity.
Case 2: t = 3r + 2 for some r 5 N.
By the induction hypothesis, S(f) _(3r + 1)  D(3r + 1) and by anonymity of f ,
the ﬂow at D(3r+1) is as shown in Figure 8: f(r+1, r, r) = (3 ,
1
6 ,
1
6 ) and the the
ﬂow at the permuted points obtains by permutation. We claim now that
S(f) _(3r + 2)  D(3r + 2). (17)
Because of the anonymity of f , we need only show
f1(r + 2, r, r) = 0.
Suppose f1(r+2, r, r) = , 0 <   13 . Deﬁne the production function F
00 by F 00(w) = 1
if w  z for some z 5 {(r+ 1, r+ 1, r+ 1), (r+ 2, r, r+ 1), (r, r+ 2, r+ 1)} and F (w) = 0
otherwise, as shown in Figure 11. By Anonymity, *3(F 00, (r+1, r+1, r+1)) = 13 . On the
other hand, by the ﬁxed-ﬂow property and ﬂow conservation, *3(F 00, (r+2, r+2, r+1)) 
+(16

2)+(
1
6

2 )+ =
1
3+ >
1
3 . So *i(F
00, (r+1, r+1, r+1)) > *i(F 00, (r+2, r+2, r+1))
for i = 1, 2, contradicting Group Monotonicity. This proves (17). Note that the anonymity
of f completely determines the entire ﬂow at D(3r+2): f1(r+1, r+1, r) = f2(r+1, r+
1, r) = f1(r+ 1, r, r+ 1) = f3(r+ 1, r, r+ 1) = f2(r, r+ 1, r+ 1) = f3(r, r+ 1, r+ 1) =
1
6 ,
as depicted on Figure 12.
Case 3: t = 3r for some r 5 N\{0}.
By the induction hypothesis, S(f)_(3r 1)  D(3r 1) (and the ﬂow at D(3r 1)
is as shown on Figure 13). It follows directly from ﬂow conservation that S(f)_(3r) 
D(3r). Moreover, by anonymity of f , the ﬂow at D(3r) must be as shown on Figure 7:
f(r, r, r) = (3 ,

3 ,

3 ), f(r  1, r, r + 1) = (0, 0,
1
6 ), and the ﬂow at each permutation of
(r  1, r, r + 1) obtains by applying that permutation to f(r + 1, r, r  1).
Step 2. Induction argument.
Let N = {1, ..., n}, n > 3. Make the induction hypothesis that that for every M  N
such that 3  |M | < n, every output-sharing method forM satisfying our ﬁve axioms is a
nearly serial method. Let * be an output-sharing method for N satisfying the ﬁve axioms.
Let f be the ﬂow system representing *. By Theorem 1 and the comments following the
deﬁnition of Anonymity, f is an anonymous ﬁxed ﬂow system. We must prove that it is
nearly diagonal.
Nearly Serial Sharing Methods 12
Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists k > 0, z 5 S(f, keN ), and i 5 N such that
¯¯¯
¯zi  z(N)n
¯¯¯
¯ > 1. (18)
We will show that ¯¯¯
¯zi  z(N\j)n 1
¯¯¯
¯ > 1 for some j 5 N\i. (19)
To see that this yields a contradiction, deﬁne the system fj = {fj(., xN\j)|xN\j 5
N
N\j\{0}} by fj(zN\j , xN\j) = fN\j((zN\j , 0j), (xN\j , 0j)). Because f is an anonymous
ﬁxed ﬂow system, fj is itself an anonymous ﬁxed ﬂow system for the agent set N\j. The
output-sharing method *j for N\j that fj represents satisﬁes
*j(Fj , xN\j) = *N\j(F, (xN\j , 0j))
for all xN\j 5 NN\j and F 5 F(N), where Fj(zN\j) := F (zN\j , 0j). Since * satisﬁes
Group Monotonicity, so does *j . Because f is a ﬁxed ﬂow system, z 5 S(f, keN ) implies
(zN\j , 0j) 5 S(f, keN\j). Hence, by deﬁnition of *j ,
zN\j 5 S(fj , keN\j), (20)
and (19) and (20) contradict the induction hypothesis.
Now we prove (19). Starting from (18), distinguish two cases: either zi  z(N)n > 1
or z(N)
n
 zi > 1. We only consider the former case, the latter is similar and left to the
reader. Without loss of generality, assume i = 1, so that
(n 1)z1 > z(N\1) + n. (21)
Assume without loss of generality
z1  z2  ...  zn. (22)
In order to prove (19), it su!ces to show that
(n 2)z1 > z(N\{1, 2}) + (n 1).
Suppose, by contradiction, that
(n 2)z1  z(N\{1, 2}) + (n 1). (23)
Then (n 1)  z(N\2) + (n 1) and therefore, by (21), z(N\1) + n < z(N\2) + (n 1).
Hence,
z2 + 1 < z1. (24)
By (22), (z3+1), ..., (zn+1) < z1, hence (n2)z1 > z(N\{1, 2})+(n2), which, combined
with (23), gives (n 2)z1 = z(N\{1, 2}) + (n 1). Using (24),
z2 <
z(N\{1, 2}) + 1
n 2
. (25)
If at least one inequality is strict in the string z3  z4  ...  zn, then zn+1  z3 and
it follows that z(N\{1, 2})+1  (n2)z3. Therefore (25) implies z2 < z3, a contradiction.
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If z3 = z4 = ... = zn, then (25) reads z2 < z3 +
1
n2 and, because of (22), z2 = z3.
Thus (23) becomes (n  2)z1  (n  2)z2 + (n  1), hence z1  z2 + n1n2 < z2 + 2 and,
since z1, z2 are integers, z1  z2 + 1. This contradicts (24).
We conclude with three comments.
1) It is easy to see that the axioms in Theorem 2 are independent. For a method
satisfying all axioms but Additivity, consider the following adjusted proportional method.
Given a problem (F, x), deﬁne aiF = min{ai|CiF (z) = 0 for all z such that zi  ai} (with
the convention that aiF = +4 if the latter set is empty) and let xiF = min{xi, aiF }.
Deﬁne *i(F, x) =
x
iF
x
F
(N)F (x) if x

F (N) > 0 (and *(F, x) = 0 if xF (N) = 0). An example
violating only Zero Output for Zero Input is the egalitarian method *i(F, x) = 1nF (x).
A method violating only Independence of Dummy Changes is the proportional method
*i(F, x) =
xi
x(N)F (x) if x(N) > 0 (and *(F, 0) = 0). For an example violating only
Anonymity, consider any ﬁxed-path method. Finally, the Shapley-Shubik method satisﬁes
all axioms but Group Monotonicity. See Moulin and Sprumont (2004) for details.
2) The proof does not use the full force of Group Monotonicity. That axiom may be
replaced in Theorem 2 by the following weaker requirement.
Pair Monotonicity. For all F 5 F(N), all x, x0 5 NN , and all pairs of distinct agents
i, j 5 N, {xi < x0i, xj < x0j , and xk = x0k for all k 5 N\ij} , {*i(F, x)  *i(F, x0) or
*j(F, x)  *j(F, x0)}.
Observe that this condition does not imply Monotonicity.
3) Finally, we repeat that the nearly serial methods form a very small class. In the
continuous model (where input contributions are real numbers), these methods have no
natural counterpart: we conjecture that the ﬁve axioms in Theorem 2 characterize pre-
cisely Friedman and Moulin’s (1999) serial method. Friedman’s (2004) representation
theorem (stating that the methods meeting Additivity and Dummy are convex combina-
tions of path methods) should prove useful in tackling this conjecture.
5. Appendix
We prove the “if” part of Theorem 2. The only statement that requires a proof is that all nearly
serial methods satisfy Group Monotonicity. Let N = {1, 2, ..., n}, n  3, let * be a nearly
serial method for N , and let f be the corresponding unbounded ﬂow. This unbounded ﬂow
is anonymous and nearly diagonal. It is therefore fully characterized by a sequence of weights
{r} as in (13). Let F 5 F(N), S  N, and let x, x0 5 NN be such that xi < x0i for all
i 5 S and xi = x0i for all i 5 N\S. Since it is well known that all ﬁxed-ﬂow methods satisfy
Monotonicity, we may assume that S contains at least two distinct agents. To shorten notation,
write f(., x) = g and f(., x0) = g0. These ﬂows obtain by projecting f on [0, x] and [0, x0],
respectively:
g = p[0,x]f (26)
and
g0 = p[0,x0]f. (27)
For ease of exposition, we give the argument for the case n = 3 ﬁrst. Without loss of
generality, let S = {1, 2}. Thus x1 < x
0
1, x2 < x
0
2 and x3 = x
0
3. Deﬁne f12 : N
N $ R{1,2} by
f12(z) = (f1(z), f2(z)). Similarly, deﬁne g12 = (g1, g2) on [0, x] and g
0
12 = (g
0
1, g
0
2) on [0, x
0].
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Case 1: x1 6= x2.
This is the easier case. Suppose that x1 < x2. Because f is nearly diagonal, (26) and (27)
give
g1(z) = g
0
1(z) for all z 5 [0, x].
It follows that *1(F, x)  *1(F, x0). Permuting the roles of 1 and 2, the same argument shows
that *2(F, x)  *2(F, x0) when x2 < x1.
Case 2: x1 = x2.
For r = 0, 1, ..., x3, deﬁne Z(r) = {z 5 [0, x] | z3 = r} and Z0(r) = {z 5 [0, x0] | z3 = r}.
For i = 1, 2, write
*i(F, x) =
x3P
r=0
yi(r),
*i(F, x
0) =
x3P
r=0
y0i(r),
where yi(r) =
P
z5Z(r) gi(z)CiF (z) and y
0
i(r) =
P
z5Z0(r) g
0
i(z)CiF (z). In order to compare
*i(F, x) and *i(F, x0), we will compare yi(r) and y0i(r) for each r = 0, 1, ..., x3.
For any r 5 N, consider the restriction of f12 to Z(r) = {z 5 NN | z3 = r}. If r 6= 0, this
mapping is fully determined by the three numbers r1, r, r+1:
f1(r, r, r) = f1(r + 1, r, r) =
r
3
,
f1(r, r  1, r) = f1(r + 1, r + 1, r) =
1
6
,
f1(r  1, r  1, r) =
1 r1
6
,
f1(r + 1, r  1, r) = f1(r, r + 1, r) =
1 r
6
,
f1(r + 2, r + 1, r) =
1 r+1
6
,
f1(., ., r) = 0 otherwise,
with the convention that 0 = 1, and f2(., ., r) obtains by permutation. See Figure 14. The
restriction of f12 to Z(0) is simply f1(1, 0, 0) =
1
3 , f1(1, 1, 0) =
1
6 , f1(2, 1, 0) =
11
6 ,
f1(., ., 0) = 0 otherwise, and f2(., ., 0) obtains by permutation.
Case 2.1: r < x3. In this case, the restriction of g12 to Z(r) and the restriction of g
0
12
to Z0(r) obtain by projecting the restriction of f12 to Z(r) on Z(r) and Z
0(r), respectively:
g12|Z(r) = pZ(r)(f12|Z(r)) and g
0
12|Z0(r) = pZ0(r)(f12|Z(r)).
If r 6= x1(= x2), it is straightforward to check that g12 and g
0
12 coincide in Z(r). Formally,
[r 6= x1], [g12(z) = g012(z) for all z 5 Z(r)]. It follows that
yi(r)  y0i(r) for i = 1, 2, for all r < x3, r 6= x1 = x2. (28)
If r = x1(= x2), the mappings g12|Z(r) and g
0
12|Z0(r) are illustrated in Figures 15.a and
15.b. This is the only delicate case. We claim that
yi(r)  y0i(r) for some i 5 {1, 2}, for r = x1 = x2 < x3. (29)
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To prove this, observe that
y1(r) =
1 r1
6
C1F (r  1, r  1, r) +
1
6
C1F (r, r  1, r) +
1 + r
6
C1F (r, r, r),
y01(r) 
1 r1
6
C1F (r  1, r  1, r) +
1
6
C1F (r, r  1, r)
+
r
3
C1F (r, r, r) +
1 r
6
C1F (r, r + 1, r) +
1 r
6
C1F (r + 1, r  1, r),
and corresponding expressions for y2(r) and y
0
2(r) obtain by permuting the ﬁrst and second
argument of the production function.
Taking dierences,
y01(r) y1(r) 
1 r
6
(C1F (r, r + 1, r) + C1F (r + 1, r  1, r) C1F (r, r, r)) ,
y02(r) y2(r) 
1 r
6
(C2F (r + 1, r, r) + C2F (r  1, r + 1, r) C2F (r, r, r)) .
Suppose now, contrary to the claim, that y0i(r) < yi(r) for i = 1, 2. Then
C1F (r, r, r) > C1F (r, r + 1, r) + C1F (r + 1, r  1, r) and
C2F (r, r, r) > C2F (r + 1, r, r) + C2F (r  1, r + 1, r).
But since F is nondecreasing,
C1F (r, r, r)  C1F (r, r + 1, r) + C2F (r  1, r + 1, r) and
C2F (r, r, r)  C2F (r + 1, r, r) + C1F (r + 1, r  1, r),
which are incompatible with the two strict inequalities just derived.
Case 2.2. r = x3. The mappings g12|Z(x3) and g
0
12|Z0(x3) obtain by projecting on Z(x3)
and Z 0(x3) the ﬁrst two components of the unbounded ﬂow f in or above Z(x3). Letting
Z(x3) = {z 5 NN | z3  x3}, we have g12|Z(x3) = pZ(x3)(f12|Z(x3)) and g
0
12|Z0(x3) =
pZ0(x3)(f12|Z(x3)
). This may be done in two steps. First we compute pZ(x3)(f12|Z(x3)
). Denot-
ing this mapping h12, we ﬁnd
h1(x3  1, x3  1, x3) =
1 x31
6
,
h1(x3, x3, x3) =
1 + x3
6
,
h1(x3 +m,x3 +m,x3) = h1(x3 +m+ 1, x3 +m,x3)
=
2 + x3+m
6
for all m 5 N\{0},
h1(x3, x3 + 1, x3) =
1 x3
6
,
h1(x3 +m,x3 +m+ 1, x3) =
2 x3+m  x3+m+1
6
for all m 5 N\{0},
h1(x3, x3  1, x3) =
1
6
,
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h1(x3 + 1, x3, x3) =
1 + 2x3
6
,
h1(x3 +m+ 1, x3 +m 1, x3) =
1 x3+m
6
, all m 5 N,
h1(., ., x3) = 0 otherwise,
and h2 obtains by permutation. Then we project h12 on Z(x3) and Z
0(x3) to obtain g12|Z(x3)
and g012|Z0(x3).
If x3 > x1(= x2), it is straightforward to check that g12 and g
0
12 coincide in Z(x3) so that
yi(x3)  y0i(x3) for i = 1, 2 if x3 > x1(= x2). (30)
If x3  x1(= x2), the argument in case 2.1 can be mimicked to show that
yi(x3)  y0i(x3) for some i 5 {1, 2}, if x3  x1 = x2. (31)
Gathering (28) to (31) establishes that *i(F, x)  *i(F, x0) for some i 5 {1, 2} when
x1 = x2 and completes the proof of Group Monotonicity when n = 3.
To generalize the argument to any n  3, deﬁne T = {i 5 S|xi  xj for all j 5 S}.
Case 1: T is a singleton, say T = {i}.
Because f is nearly diagonal, (26) and (27) give
gi(z) = g
0
i(z) for all z 5 [0, x]
and it follows that *i(F, x)  *i(F, x0).
Case 2: T is not a singleton.
By deﬁnition, all agents in T contribute the same number of units, say, xi =  for all
i 5 T . Deﬁne fT : NN $ RT by fT (z) = (f i(z))i5T . Similarly, deﬁne gT = (gi)i5T on
[0, x] and g0T = (g
0
i)i5T on [0, x
0]. For any rN\T 5 [0, xN\T ], deﬁne Z(rN\T ) = {z 5 [0, x] |
zN\T = rN\T } and Z
0(rN\T ) = {z 5 [0, x0] | zN\T = rN\T }. For i 5 T,
*i(F, x) =
P
rN\T5[0,xN\T ]
yi(rN\T ),
*i(F, x
0) =
P
rN\T5[0,x0N\T ]
y0i(rN\T )

P
rN\T5[0,xN\T ]
y0i(rN\T ),
where yi(rN\T ) =
P
z5Z(rN\T ) gi(z)CiF (z) and y
0
i(rN\T ) =
P
z5Z0(rN\T ) g
0
i(z)CiF (z). In
order to compare *i(F, x) and *i(F, x0), we will compare yi(rN\T ) and y0i(rN\T ) for each
rN\T 5 [0, xN\T ].
Fix rN\T 5 [0, xN\T ] and let Z(rN\T ) = {z 5 NN | zN\T = rN\T}. Let R1 = {i 5 N\T |
ri < xi}, R2 = {i 5 N\T | ri = xi}, and let Z(rN\T ) = {z 5 NN | zR1 = rR1 and
zR2  xR2}. Deﬁne h : Z(rN\T )$ RT+ by
h = pZ(rN\T )(fT |Z(rN\T )
).
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By construction, this mapping is nearly diagonal with respect to T : for all z 5 Z(rN\T ) and
all i 5 T, hi(z) = 0 whenever zT /5 DT or zT  eiT /5 DT , where DT denotes the near diagonal
of NT . Moreover, h is anonymous with respect to T : for all (zT , rN\T ) 5 Z(rN\T ) and any
permutation  on T , h(zT , rN\T ) = h(zT , rN\T ). Finally, by (26) and (27),
gT |Z(rN\T ) = pZ(rN\T )h (32)
and
g0T |Z0(rN\T ) = pZ0(rN\T )h. (33)
It is tedious but easy to verify that
yi(rN\T )  y0i(rN\T ) for all i 5 T, for all rN\T 6= e
N
N\T a xN\T , (34)
where (zN\T a z0N\T )i = min{zi, z
0
i} for all i 5 N\T. This follows directly from the projection
formulas (32), (33) and the fact that h is nearly diagonal with respect to T.
The more di!cult case is when rN\T = eNN\T a xN\T . We claim that
yi(eNN\T a xN\T )  y
0
i(e
N
N\T a xN\T ) for some i 5 T. (35)
Let us prove this claim for the case eN
N\T ¿ xN\T ﬁrst. The projection formulas (33), (34)
yield
y0i(e
N
N\T ) yi(e
N
N\T )

1 
n(n 1)
P
j5T\i
[CiF ((+ 1)ei + ( 1)ej + eN\ij)
+CiF ((+ 1)ej + eN\j) CiF
¡
eN
¢
]
where n(n1) is the number of permutations of the point (1)e1+e{2,...,n1}+(+1)en.
Suppose, by contradiction, that y0i(eNN\T ) < yi(e
N
N\T ) for all i 5 T. Then
P
j5T\i CiF
¡
eN
¢
>
P
j5T\i[CiF ((+1)e
i+(1)ej+eN\ij)+CiF ((+1)ej+eN\j)] for all i 5 T. Summing
up these inequalities,P
i5T
P
j5T\i
CiF
¡
eN
¢
>
P
i5T
P
j5T\i
[CiF ((+ 1)ei + ( 1)ej + eN\ij) + CiF ((+ 1)ej + eN\j)]
=
P
i5T
P
j5T\i
[CjF (( 1)ei + (+ 1)ej + eN\ij) + CiF ((+ 1)ej + eN\j)].
But since F is nondecreasing,
CiF
¡
eN
¢
 CjF (( 1)ei + (+ 1)ej + eN\ij) + CiF ((+ 1)ej + eN\j)
for all i 5 T, j 5 T\i, a contradiction.
Dispensing now with the assumption eN
N\T ¿ xN\T , let rN\T = e
N
N\T a xN\T . Because
h is nearly diagonal and anonymous with respect to T , we obtain
y0i(rN\T ) yi(rN\T )
 A
P
j5T\i
[CiF
³
(+ 1)eiT + ( 1)e
j
T + e
N\ij
T , rN\T
´
+CiF
³
(+ 1)ejT + e
N\j
T , rN\T
´
 CiF
¡
eNT , rN\T
¢
],
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where A is a coe!cient that does not depend on i. If y0i(rN\T ) < yi(rN\T ) for all i 5 T, a
contradiction is obtained just as before.
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